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EDITORIAL | More than half a century of blackouts, official promises and energy policy decisions makes it impossible to blame a U.S. president for the origins of Cuba’s electricity disaster.
Documentary research current through October 20, 2026.
No. Donald Trump is not responsible for the origins of Cuba’s blackouts, nor did he create the island’s electricity crisis. Recurring power outages, breakdowns, planning failures and promises of a solution were documented decades before he entered the White House. Political responsibility for running the country and its energy system throughout that period rests with the Castro regime.
That conclusion requires a distinction: establishing the regime’s responsibility does not mean pretending that U.S. sanctions have no effects. A restriction on fuel supplies can worsen power cuts. What it cannot do is retroactively explain the poor maintenance Fidel Castro acknowledged in 1971 or erase decisions made in Havana. The origins of a crisis, its accumulated vulnerabilities and the factors that aggravate it are different issues.
Cuba’s blackouts: a timeline
- 1966: Granma runs the headline “Los apagones: un problema temporal” (“Blackouts: a temporary problem”).
- 1971: Fidel Castro acknowledges near-daily peak-demand blackouts in a speech in Chile.
- 1990–1993: After the Soviet collapse, oil and fuel imports fall from 10.2 to 5.5 million metric tons.
- 1992: Work on the Juraguá nuclear plant stops after more than $1.1 billion invested.
- 2004: A breakdown at the Antonio Guiteras plant triggers months of outages.
- 2006: Fidel Castro promises Pinar del Río will “never again” have blackouts.
- 2007: State television presents blackouts as a thing of the past.
- 2014: The government sets a goal of 24% renewable energy by 2030.
- 2015: Raúl Castro announces Russian financing for 800 MW of new units.
- 2022: Hydro, wind and solar plants supply about 2.3% of gross generation.
- October 2024: The national grid collapses after the Guiteras plant fails, months before Trump’s second term.
- 2026: Crude imports dry up; by September 18 the grid has collapsed nationwide eight times this year.

The blackouts Fidel Castro acknowledged in 1971
On November 29, 1971, during his visit to Chile, Fidel Castro explained that peak electricity demand was being felt “almost every day” and was translating into blackouts. He acknowledged maintenance problems and mistakes in purchasing electric stoves, alongside rates that encouraged consumption. The speech is preserved in Archivo Chile; the passage appears on page 3 of the PDF.
The document establishes a verifiable starting point: recurring blackouts in Cuba did not begin with the Special Period. Nor did they begin with Trump, who first assumed the U.S. presidency in 2017. The chronology refutes that personal attribution; by itself, it does not measure every historical effect of the embargo.
The 1971 admission also describes a failure of government. When electrification and household appliances increase demand, the state that controls the system is responsible for expanding and maintaining supply. Giving families access to a stove or a fan requires planning; it does not make those families responsible for the shortfall.
Cuba’s blackouts did not begin in 1971, either. In a report published by Diario las Américas on September 20, 2025, journalist Iván García quoted a resident of Ovas, in Pinar del Río, who recalled that within days of his hamlet’s electrification in 1966, low voltage and two- to three-hour outages followed. A retired electrical engineer quoted in the same report estimated that some regions endured outages lasting up to eight hours a day during that decade. These are testimonies, not official statistics, but they are consistent with the 1966 newspaper clipping accompanying this editorial and with Fidel’s admission in Chile.
The Special Period deepened an existing dependence
The loss of Soviet supplies dramatically worsened the problem in the 1990s. Former Economy Minister José Luis Rodríguez wrote that imports of oil and petroleum products fell from 10.2 million metric tons in 1990 to 5.5 million in 1993. His analysis also describes the adaptation of thermal power plants to burn heavy domestic crude.
That dependence was also shaped by Cuba’s own decisions. Beginning in the early 1970s, Cuba sold petroleum products derived largely from Soviet crude in Western Europe for hard currency; over time, it expanded those sales to crude oil itself, according to a study by economist Jorge F. Pérez-López published in The Energy Journal in 1987. A former Foreign Trade official quoted by Diario las Américas argues that some of the blackouts of those years could have been avoided by using that fuel at home.
The costliest example of that strategy is the Juraguá nuclear power plant in Cienfuegos. Construction began in 1983 with Soviet VVER-440 reactors and was halted in 1992, after more than $1.1 billion had already been invested. Today, only ruins remain. State media had presented it as “the project of the century”; its planned 880 MW never reached the grid.

Foreign supplies kept a system operating whose vulnerability resurfaced when it lost its main provider. Governing responsibly meant reducing that risk. Dependence on political support offered no lasting guarantee of energy security.
In 2004, the Antonio Guiteras plant failed again
The 2004 crisis was triggered by a major breakdown at the Antonio Guiteras thermal power plant. IPS’s contemporary account records disruptions in generation beginning in May and extraordinary measures affecting economic activity. The return to normal announced in November did not eliminate scheduled blackouts.
The episode matters because it reveals a system vulnerable to the loss of one essential facility. Installed capacity on paper is not enough: reliable equipment, fuel, transmission networks and reserves are needed to withstand breakdowns.
Subsequent recoveries should not be erased from the record, either. Cuba experienced periods of greater stability. Acknowledging them makes it possible to assess the real failure: the announced solutions did not ensure lasting reliability.
| Year | Total | Thermal power plants | Self-producers* | Gas turbines | Grid-connected generator sets | Hydro | Wind and solar | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 20,837.0 | 11,465.6 | 763.0 | 2,637.2 | 5,657.9 | 145.5 | 167.8 | — |
| 2019 | 20,705.6 | 12,664.8 | 841.9 | 2,449.8 | 4,371.7 | 124.5 | 250.5 | 2.5 |
| 2020 | 19,070.9 | 11,806.8 | 898.2 | 2,014.9 | 3,962.4 | 111.9 | 260.8 | 15.9 |
| 2021 | 17,965.5 | 11,014.2 | 752.6 | 1,580.4 | 4,125.6 | 119.7 | 265.0 | 108.0 |
| 2022 | 15,732.1 | 9,446.8 | 588.7 | 1,946.3 | 3,272.9 | 120.2 | 241.5 | 115.7 |
The promises to end Cuba’s blackouts
On January 17, 2006, Fidel Castro declared: “Pinar del Río will never again experience blackouts.” An EFE dispatch from the time linked the promise to newly installed generating capacity.
In December 2007, a report on the Mesa Redonda television program presented power cuts as eliminated and described a grid capable of withstanding major contingencies. The announcement went on the record; lasting stability was not guaranteed.
On June 21, 2014, the Council of Ministers approved the “Policy for the Long-Term Development of Renewable Energy Sources and Efficient Energy Use, 2014–2030.” According to the Ministry of Energy and Mines, its main goals included raising the use of renewable sources to 24% and avoiding increased dependence on imported fuels for generation. That official target, set before Trump’s first term, must also be judged by its results. By 2022, hydroelectric, wind and solar plants together still supplied only about 2.3% of gross generation, according to ONEI data (bagasse-fired generation is counted separately).
Fifteen years after the 2007 announcement, Granma acknowledged that the fire at Felton Unit 2 had prevented authorities from meeting their commitment to provide 740 MW for the summer of 2022. In May 2024, the leadership of the state electricity utility, Unión Eléctrica (UNE), again announced improvements for the summer, while making clear it could not commit to eliminating power cuts.
In May 2025, the target published by Granma was to reduce outages to an average of four hours a day per customer. That qualification matters: an average does not guarantee a four-hour maximum for every home. Nor is a promise to reduce blackouts the same as a promise to eliminate them.
The pattern is clear without inflating it: for decades, authorities have announced solutions to Cuba’s blackouts, and none has delivered stable service.
Havana’s allies also manufacture power-generation technology
The world does not depend on a single U.S. supplier for power-generation equipment. China has Dongfang Electric; Russia has Power Machines; and India has BHEL. Their catalogs document the manufacture of turbines, generators, boilers and other power-plant equipment.
China and Russia are also Havana’s political partners. International opposition to the embargo is documented at the United Nations; that diplomatic support must be distinguished from a specific commercial contract.
The serious argument is not that Cuba can buy any machine without restrictions. The existence of a manufacturer does not guarantee credit, insurance, transportation, technical compatibility or compliance with the rules applicable to each transaction. It does, however, require an examination of which agreements were negotiated, how much was paid and what results they produced.
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There are documented agreements. In a speech published by Granma on December 30, 2015, Raúl Castro highlighted Russian financing on favorable terms for four 200 MW units: 800 MW in planned capacity. That announcement predates Trump and demands accountability over implementation, deadlines and obstacles. It does not justify presenting the announced 800 MW as capacity actually installed.
Two months earlier, on October 20, 2015, RT en Español reported, citing a draft agreement approved by the Russian government, a €1.2 billion state export loan for those four units: one at the Máximo Gómez thermal power plant and three at the Este Habana thermal power plant. The agreement still required signature by Russia’s Finance Ministry after negotiations with the Cuban side.
There have also been deliveries. In September 2024, Granma reported that China had donated 10 generators expected to contribute about 18 MW. In December, it announced the arrival of 69 metric tons of components under a project to restore 400 MW of distributed generation. The arrival of that first shipment does not, by itself, establish that all 400 MW were restored.
These facts disprove an absolute inability to receive foreign energy technology. The unanswered question is why cooperation, supplies and announcements have not translated into sufficient, sustained electricity.
The maintenance backlog the regime itself acknowledges
In May 2024, UNE’s director general explained that Felton Unit 2 was in a state of permanent breakdown and that, among the other 15 thermal generating units, all but one were overdue for scheduled maintenance. He also said the system required about $300 million a year that had not been available in recent years.
This is an admission by the institution that runs the service. The problem cannot be reduced to a delayed fuel tanker: it includes accumulated decisions about maintenance and financing.
An analysis by José Luis Rodríguez published in Granma in February 2024 called for correcting investment imbalances. Between January and September 2023, the sugar industry had received 0.5% of total investment; electricity, gas and water supply together received 10.8%. The latter category is not exclusively electricity investment.
Scarce resources force choices. That is precisely why the government must explain its priorities, its results and the cost of projects that fail to deliver what was promised.
Dismantling the sugar industry also had energy consequences
Sugar mills used sugarcane bagasse to produce steam and electricity. A technical document hosted by the FAO records 149 mills with turbine generators out of a total of 156, with 72 synchronized to the national grid. The industry generated 1,262 GWh in 1991, or 9.6% of the country’s electricity generation.
Installed capacity is not net delivery to the grid: the mills consumed much of the power they generated and needed modernization. Their full capacity was never electricity available to households.
The 2002 restructuring, known as the Álvaro Reynoso Task, called for taking 71 mills out of operation: 61 to be dismantled, five held in reserve and five converted into museums. Another 71 would continue producing raw sugar, while 14 would produce sugar and molasses for animal feed, according to the account published by the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE).
The energy inference is reasonable: the contraction in sugarcane cultivation and milling weakened the biomass base and opportunities for cogeneration. What this record does not allow us to calculate is how many net megawatts were lost solely because of each closure.
The Ciro Redondo case demonstrates that investment alone is insufficient when execution fails. In January 2024, Granma described problems at the mill and its bioelectric plant, rotor vibrations and missed startup dates, despite a combined investment exceeding $330 million.
What Cuba gave away—and what other governments financed
There are also verifiable examples of industrial resources sent abroad. The Victoria de Julio sugar mill, also known as TIMAL, in Nicaragua received Cuban financing that Fidel Castro forgave at its inauguration in January 1985. La Prensa puts the amount at $73.8 million; figures published in other accounts differ.
A December 1984 Cayman Compass report stated that the factory had originally been planned under a Cuban program and would incorporate bagasse-fired generation to meet its own needs and those of nearby communities. This is a relevant example of industrial resource allocation. It is not a quantified explanation of today’s blackouts.
In Vietnam, sources in the recipient country describe the Nuoc Trong factory as a Cuban gift: construction began in 1988 and it opened in 1992. Neither project can be presented as a consequence of the sugar-industry dismantling of 2002, because both came earlier.
In Haiti, by contrast, an institutional bulletin attributes financing for three thermal power plants, with a combined capacity of 61.2 MW, to Venezuela and their construction to a Cuban company. Describing them as plants paid for entirely by Cuba would misrepresent who bore the cost.
Why Trump did not cause Cuba’s blackouts
U.S. measures must be described according to their dates and scope. On January 29, 2026, Trump signed an order establishing a mechanism to impose tariffs on countries supplying oil to Cuba. On February 20, another order directed that the additional tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by the listed orders—including the one concerning Cuba—would cease to be in effect, without thereby eliminating all other measures.
On May 1, a new order authorized sanctions against foreign persons designated by U.S. authorities under criteria that include activity in Cuba’s energy sector. This is not an automatic ban on every foreign transaction, but neither does it support a claim that suppliers always face no sanctions risk.
The strongest argument on the other side deserves a direct answer. In 2026, Cuba’s fuel supply did collapse. According to S&P Global Commodities at Sea data, the island received no crude shipments in January or February. Venezuelan supply stopped after the United States removed Nicolás Maduro on January 3, and Mexico paused its shipments after the January 29 order. In 2025, Venezuela had supplied 61% of Cuba’s crude imports and Mexico 25%.
That shock is real, and it has made daily life harder. But it hit a system that was already failing. On October 18, 2024—three months before Trump returned to the White House—Cuba’s entire grid went down after the Antonio Guiteras plant failed. Nor are this year’s outages only about fuel: the eighth nationwide collapse of 2026, on September 18, began with a trip on the 220 kV Matanzas–Cienfuegos transmission line, according to the UNE.
The utility’s own report for October 19, 2026, tells the same story. Available capacity was 830 MW against a forecast peak demand of 2,820 MW, with a shortfall expected to reach 2,020 MW. Eight thermal generating units—at Mariel, Santa Cruz, Antonio Guiteras, Felton and Renté—were out of service because of breakdowns, and three more were under maintenance. A missing tanker does not break a turbine. Those breakdowns are the bill for decades of deferred maintenance.
The human cost of Cuba’s blackouts now reaches beyond the light switch. On October 19, 2026, Alexis Acosta, vice president of the water and sanitation business group of Cuba’s National Institute of Water Resources (INRH), said on state television that around 2.5 million people had their water service affected by the power cuts, as reported by teleSUR.
Restrictions can complicate supplies and transactions. Their effect on a particular blackout must be established through the technical cause, the available fuel and the transaction affected. Not every power cut can be blamed on Washington, and external influences cannot simply be dismissed as a matter of principle.
But none of those measures explains the blackouts Fidel acknowledged in 1971, the crisis of 2004, the promises of 2006 or the maintenance backlog admitted in 2024. The record rules out making Trump the author of a crisis that predates his administrations.
Jorge Piñón, director of the Latin America and Caribbean Energy Program at the University of Texas at Austin, estimated in September 2025 that overcoming Cuba’s blackouts would take three to five years and up to $10 billion. He acknowledges that the embargo complicates financing, but identifies the centralized Cuban economic model as the main cause.
The accountability citizens have a right to demand
For Cubanos por el Mundo, political and structural responsibility for the electricity disaster rests with the Castro regime: it has concentrated decisions over the system’s planning, investment and operation, and must answer for the results. This is an editorial judgment grounded in the facts above, not a claim that every interruption has a single physical cause.
Citizens have a right to know how much was allocated to maintenance, what happened to each announced project, which equipment is available and which dependencies the government chose to preserve. The word “embargo” is no substitute for that accounting.
Trump was not governing Cuba when Fidel acknowledged the blackouts. Nor did he decide on the sugar-industry restructuring or manage UNE’s maintenance schedules. The regime that demands credit for every megawatt it inaugurates must also answer for those it failed to secure.
From our archive: Díaz-Canel celebrates Cuba’s energy transition while Cubans continue waiting for reliable electricity (in Spanish).
Related coverage: Cuba and Haiti: The Misery the Regime Cannot Blame on Washington and U.S. Exports to Cuba Hit Record High, Led by Fuel.
English version of the original Spanish editorial. Quotations from Spanish-language sources have been translated into English. Most of the sources linked in this editorial are in Spanish.
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